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MISTAKEN BIDS AND UNILATERAL MISTAKEN
ASSUMPTIONS, A NEW SOLUTION 
FOR AN OLD PROBLEM?
John D. McCamus*
The “two-contract” analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Ron Engineering has created a very substantial obstacle to relief for
mistaken bidders who discover calculation errors upon the opening of the
bids.  Nonetheless, Canadian courts are inclined to narrowly distinguish
that analysis and grant relief in cases of extreme error in order to avoid
unduly onerous penalties for mistaken bidders and large unearned
windfalls for issuers of invitations to bid.  This article argues that recent
decisions of Canadian appellate courts articulating a rule which would
excuse bidders where the burden imposed by the miscalculation is so
grossly disproportionate that enforcement of the mistaken bid would be
unconscionable represent a more satisfactory and elegant solution to the
problem of mistaken bids and represents a useful incremental change in the
law of contractual mistake.
L’analyse de la Cour suprême portant sur les « deux contrats » dans
l’arrêt Ron Engineering a créé un obstacle important pour les
soumissionnaires qui se rendent compte d’une erreur de calcul à la date
d’ouverture des soumissions et qui sollicitent une réparation. Néanmoins,
les tribunaux canadiens sont portés à distinguer cette analyse, de façon
restrictive, et d’accorder un dédommagement dans les cas d’erreur très
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grave afin d’éviter d’infliger des sanctions indûment sévères aux
soumissionnaires qui font erreur et d’accorder injustement des gains
inespérés à la société responsable de l’appel d’offres. Le présent article
soutient que les décisions récentes des cours d’appel canadiennes
exprimant une règle qui accorderait une dispense pour les
soumissionnaires dans le cas où la peine imposée à la suite de l’erreur de
calcul est si disproportionnée que l’exécution de l’offre erronée serait
déraisonnable, offrent une solution plus satisfaisante et élégante au
problème engendré par les offres erronées et représentent un changement
graduel et utile au droit en matière d’erreur contractuelle.
1. Introduction
The Canadian common law of contracts has had a difficult time dealing
with the legal issues arising from the perennial problem of mistaken bids.
In the typical case of this kind, a bidder responds to an invitation to tender
by submitting a bid to the issuer of the invitation. The bid contains an
unsuspected clerical or mathematical error with the result that the bid price
is accidentally reduced, perhaps to a very significant degree. Upon the
opening of the bids, the mistaken bidder, whose bid may be substantially
below the second lowest bid, checks the calculations, discovers the error
and advises the issuer of its existence. In such circumstances, can the
mistaken bidder be forced by the issuer of the invitation to carry on with
the project at the accidentally low price? If not, can the mistaken bidder
successfully recover any deposit paid to secure that performance? 
In its decision in R. v. Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern)
Ltd.,1 the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the trend of prior Canadian
case law and effectively precluded any form of relief for the mistaken
bidder. It did so on the basis of a novel analysis that will be referred to here
as a “two-contract” analysis of the relationship between bidders and issuers
of invitations to tender. Despite this apparently authoritative statement, the
problem of mistaken bids persists. As a practical matter, bid errors appear
to be endemic to the tendering process. Further, mistaken bidders continue
to assert claims for relief and, at least in extreme cases of what might be
referred to as gross error, courts appear to be inclined to find indirect
means for providing relief in some form. In particular, courts have
attempted, with some artificiality, to apply the “palpable error” rule to
these situations with results, it will be argued here, that are less than
satisfactory.
2 [Vol.87
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The burden of this article is to suggest that a more direct and elegant
solution to the problem of mistaken bids is available. In two recent
decisions, Alberta2 and Ontario3 appellate judges have expressed the view
that mistaken bidders should be excused from their obligations where the
burden imposed by the error is so grossly disproportionate that
enforcement of the mistaken bid would be unconscionable. What is being
proposed, in effect, is the recognition of a rule permitting rescission of the
bidder’s contractual obligations on the basis of the bidder’s unilateral
mistaken assumption. The error is unilateral in the sense that the
calculation error is the bidder’s alone. It is not shared by the issuer. The
error pertains to an assumption on the bidder’s part that the calculation of
the price was accurate. As we shall see, this approach, if more widely
adopted, represents a significant adjustment to the law of mistaken
assumptions. It will be urged here, however, that the proposed rule, which
is in fact the current American rule, is sound and that it provides a sensible
solution to the problem of mistaken bids.
Before turning to consider the proposed solution to the mistaken bid
problem, it will be useful to portray briefly the innovative two-contract
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ron Engineering, to
explicate in greater detail the nature of the mistaken bid problem and the
reasons for its persistence and to provide a sketch of the law of contractual
mistake as it applies to the phenomenon of the mistaken bid. This article
then examines the unilateral mistaken assumption rule articulated in the
recent Canadian cases and notes its rather precise similarity to the
American rule on point. The article then offers a defence of the unilateral
mistaken assumptions rule and its application to cases of mistaken bids. A
number of arguments that support the rule will be examined. Finally, we
consider and then reject what appear to be the arguments that could be
made against the rule.
2. The New “Two-Contract” Logic of Ron Engineering
Since 1981, the year of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Ron Engineering,4 Canadian students of the common law of contract have
been taught that the submission of a tender or bid in response to an
invitation to tender is normally considered to constitute an acceptance of
an offer constituted by the invitation, thereby creating, as it was called in
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2 Calgary (City) v. Northern Construction Co., [1986] 2 W.W.R. 426 (Alta. C.A.),
aff’d [1987] 2 S.C.R. 757 at 443, per Kerans J.A. [Northern Construction].
3 Toronto Transit Commission v. Gottardo Construction Ltd. (2005), 257 D.L.R.
(4th) 539 (Ont. C.A.) at 548, per Rouleau J.A. [Gottardo].
4 Supra note 1.
that case, “Contract A.” In Ron Engineering, the Supreme Court decided
that “Contract A” related to the bidding process and created a binding
contract out of the terms and conditions set out in the invitation to tender.
Contract A was to be distinguished from “Contract B,” the latter being the
contract that would ultimately be entered into by the successful bidder and
the issuer of the invitation to tender. In the typical case of a tendered
building project, then, Contract A, constituted by the invitation and the
submitted bid, would settle the terms of the bidding process. All bidders
would enter a Contract A with the issuer of the invitation. Contract B
would be the building contract ultimately entered into with the successful
bidder. This innovative Canadian analysis can be contrasted with the
traditional (and current) English approach which, generally speaking,
holds that the invitation to tender is not an offer but a mere invitation to
treat. It is the submission of a bid that constitutes an offer that, in turn, may
or may not be accepted by the issuer of the invitation. When the issuer
accepts one of the bids, a contract is created between the successful bidder
and the issuer of the invitation. In other words, the traditional English
approach envisages only one contract between the parties, that being, in
Canadian terms, Contract B.5
In Ron Engineering, the implication of Contract A was designed to
deal with the problem of mistaken bids. In that case, the Crown issued an
invitation to bid on a particular project. Pursuant to the terms of the
invitation, the plaintiff bidder had been required to pay a $150,000 bid
deposit upon submission of its bid. The plaintiff’s bid price was
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5 Although it is occasionally suggested that Ron Engineering decided nothing new
and that English law is the same as Canadian law on this point, this does not appear to be
correct. The similarity between English and Canadian common law is that the question of
whether a contract is created by the submission of a bid rests upon the intention of the
parties. The difference between the two, however, is that English law generally assumes
that no such intention is to be implied, whereas Canadian law, after Ron Engineering,
appears to assume that such an intention is normally present. In contrast to the Canadian
position, then, English law persists in the view that it is normally the case that it is the bid
that constitutes an offer that may ultimately be accepted by the issuer of the invitation. See
generally I.N. Duncan Wallace, Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts, 11th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 13 (“…but more usually, it is the tender submitted in
response to an invitation to submit tenders which is the offer and which, if accepted by the
employer, will result in a binding contract”) and 410-15; Stephen Furst and Vivian Ramsey,
Keating on Building Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 2. Nonetheless, in
English law, there may be circumstances present, such as a commitment in the invitation to
accept the lowest bid price, that may be considered evidence of an implied intention to enter
what a Canadian lawyer would call “Contract A.” See e.g. Harvela Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.,
[1986] A.C. 207 at 224; Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v. Blackpool B.C., [1990] 1 W.L.R.
1195 (C.A.) [Blackpool] (implication of a limited contractual right to at least consider bids
submitted in timely fashion).
$2,748,000. Upon the opening of the bids, the plaintiff discovered that its
bid was some $632,000 below the second lowest bid. Upon rechecking its
calculations, it discovered that it had omitted a $750,058 item relating to
its own workforce which would have increased its bid to $3,498,058.
Under prior Canadian law6 it had been accepted that in such
circumstances, the issuer of the invitation was not in a position to “accept”
the “offer” constituted by the bid because, prior to acceptance, the issuer
had become aware that the bidder (the offeror) did not intend to contract
on the basis of the written terms in the bid. The issuer could not “snap up”
the bidder’s erroneous offer.7 This was not, however, the issue in the Ron
Engineering case itself. In Ron Engineering the Crown did not attempt to
force the plaintiff into an acceptance of the building contract. Rather, the
Crown merely took the position that it was entitled to retain the bid deposit.
The plaintiff’s attempt to recover the deposit was rejected on the basis of
the new “two-contract” analysis of tendering processes articulated by the
Supreme Court in this case.8 Contract A had been created by the
submission of the bid and Contract A provided that the bid deposit would
be forfeited in the event that the bidder, if selected by the Crown as the
winning bidder, refused to enter into Contract B. Contract A was
unaffected by the calculation error. As Estey J. remarked, “… no mistake
existed which impeded or affected the coming into being of contract A.”9
For Estey J., then, the calculation error did not in any way impair the
contractor’s intention to submit a bid of $2,748,000. However misguided,
the plaintiff intended to submit a bid at that price and, in so doing, entered
into Contract A. Under its binding terms, the deposit was forfeited. 
It is important to note, however, that Ron Engineering did not consider
the question of the impact that this novel contract analysis might have on
the formation of Contract B. Could the mistaken bidder be forced, in effect,
to enter Contract B? In Estey J.’s view that was another matter. The
possible effect of the calculation mistake on the enforceability of or
interpretation of Contract B was simply not before the court. From a
practical perspective, the two issues do appear severable. It is one thing to
52008] Mistaken Bids and Unilateral Mistaken Assumptions...
6 Belle River Community Arena Inc. v. W.J.C. Kaufmann Co. Ltd. (1978), 87 D.L.R.
(3d) 761 (Ont. C.A.) [Belle River].
7 See generally John D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2005) at 501-04 [McCamus, The Law of Contracts].
8 It is of merely passing interest, given the enormous importance that the Ron
Engineering decision has acquired, that the two-contract analysis was not actually
necessary to dispose of the merits of the dispute between the parties – a restitutionary claim
by the mistaken bidder to recover its deposit. The Court could simply have denied relief on
the basis that the enrichment of the defendant was not unjust in the circumstances. The two-
contract analysis is now, however, a well-established feature of the Canadian law of
tendering.
9 Supra note 1 at 125.
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hold that a mistaken bidder who refuses to enter Contract B forfeits his
deposit, quite another to expose that bidder to a claim for damages for
refusing to enter Contract B. It is of considerable interest that Estey J.
appeared reluctant to opine that the mistaken bidder could be forced to
enter Contract B. The logic of his two-contract analysis would suggest,
however, that this would indeed be the result. Estey J. did not limit the
scope of Contract A, as he might have done,10 to an understanding
concerning the deposit. All of the terms of the invitation were to be
included in Contract A. Contract A would therefore typically include a
requirement, presumably binding in nature, that the bidder selected by the
issuer would enter Contract B. Indeed, subsequent decisions have
confirmed that Contract A also imposes a binding obligation on the
successful bidder to enter Contract B.11 Refusal to enter Contract B in such
circumstances therefore sounds in damages.12 In the typical case, then, the
mistaken bidder would be liable to the issuer for the difference between the
mistaken price and the bid price of the second lowest acceptable bid.
The decision in Ron Engineering, then, has had a significant impact on
the law relating to mistaken bids. Prior law having been overruled, the
mistaken bidder was essentially shut out of any form of relief. The
mistaken bidder’s bid deposit or bond was enforceable and the mistaken
bidder could be forced to enter into Contract B or, upon refusal to do so,
face the prospect of a substantial damages claim. What was not apparent at
the time of the decision, however, was the enormous legal and practical
impact that the decision would eventually have on the law and practice of
tendering in a more general way.13 The explanation for this expansive,
indeed explosive, effect on the law of tendering is not some peculiar
6 [Vol.87
10 The idea that Contract A might consist merely of an intentionally binding
arrangement concerning the deposit to the effect that it would be forfeited regardless of the
bidder’s reason for refusing to proceed appears not to have been explored in Ron
Engineering. The court simply assumed that Contract A was constituted by the entirety of
the invitation to bid. In English law, however, the possibility that a preliminary agreement,
or, in Canadian terms, a Contract A, may consist of something less than the complete
invitation has been considered; see e.g. Blackpool, supra note 5.
11 Supra note 2.
12 M.J.B. Enterprises v. Defence Construction (1951) Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 619.
13 Although the decision in Ron Engineering attracted vigorous criticism at the time,
the enormous potential that the decision contained for complicating the legal position of
issuers was, by and large, not foreseen; see e.g. Joost Blom, “Mistaken Bids: The Queen in
Right of Ontario v. Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd.” (1981-82) 6 Can. Bus.
L. J. 80; John Swan, “Comment on The Queen v. Ron Engineering & Construction
(Eastern) Ltd.” (1981) 15 U.B.C. L. Rev. 447; R. S. Nozick, “Comment on The Province
of Ontario and The Water Resources Commission v. Ron Engineering and Construction
(Eastern) Ltd.” (1982) 60 Can. Bar. Rev. 345; G.H.L. Fridman, “Tendering Problems”
(1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 582. 
Canadian mathematical disability that has produced a proliferation of
mistaken bid cases but, rather, a subsequent line of authority that has
inferred a series of obligations to be present in Contract A including,
principally, an obligation on the part of the issuers of invitations to treat all
bidders “fairly and equally.”14 Many unsuccessful bidders take the view, it
seems, that they have been treated unfairly or unequally and an impressive
body of case law has developed. Indeed, the Ron Engineering line of
authority has proven to be a treasure trove for the legal profession.15 At the
same time, of course, it has created a hazardous set of traps for those who
issue invitations to tender in the modern post-Ron Engineering legal
environment. In my limited personal experience of the phenomenon, it is
not uncommon to find that one or more or all of a group of unsuccessful
competitive bidders feel that they have a plausible Ron Engineering claim
for breach of the issuer’s duty to treat all of the bidders fairly and equally.
As a consequence, it is not uncommon for well-advised issuers to simply
stipulate in the invitation that there is no contract of any kind created by
the submission of a bid. 
3. The Persistence of the Mistaken Bid Problem
For all of the achievements of the mighty acorn planted by the Supreme
Court in Ron Engineering, however, perhaps the crowning irony of this
line of authority is that the decision appears not to have completely solved
the problem of mistaken bids, the problem to which it was initially
addressed. Lawsuits arising from mistaken bids have not disappeared, as
they should have done if Ron Engineering was taken by the profession at
its word. There is little room left by that decision for an argument that a
mistaken bidder ought to be excused from the burdens of Contract B.
Nonetheless, such claims continue to surface in the law reports, as is
illustrated by the recent claim by a mistaken bidder in Toronto Transit
Commission v. Gottardo Construction Ltd.16 There is, I think, an obvious
and quite sensible reason for the persistence of litigation by mistaken
bidders. That reason is that the results dictated in mistaken bid cases by the
holding in the Ron Engineering line of authority are, in many
circumstances at least, simply and palpably unjust. 
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14 See generally McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 7 at 742-43.
15 A recent Quicklaw check of citations to Ron Engineering produced 231 citations,
this being, we may safely assume, the substantial tip of a no doubt much larger litigation
iceberg. The number of billable hours taken up with advising issuers and bidders as to
whether or not particular decisions would or did amount to fair or unequal treatment is also,
of course, inestimable.
16 Supra note 3.
Consider, for example, the underlying facts of the recent decision in
Ottawa (City) Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. Canvar Construction (1991)
Inc.17 Canvar, a building contractor, had submitted a bid of $2,289,000 on
a municipal housing project. Upon the opening of the bids, Canvar realized
that a mistake had been made. On rechecking its calculations, it discovered
that the bid should have been stated at $2,989,000, a $700,000 difference
on an approximately $3 million contract – almost one quarter of the entire
price. The second lowest bid was $3,130,000. The municipality refused to
allow Canvar to withdraw its bid, awarded the contract to the second
lowest bidder and sued Canvar for the $841,000 difference between the
mistaken bid and the second lowest bid. It is not at all obvious that the
mistaken bidder’s clerical or mathematical slip should result in a windfall
of this size to the defendant municipality. In effect, the municipality would
acquire the building at much less than its true cost. Nor does it appear that
justice requires that so draconian a sanction be imposed on the mistaken
bidder as a result of an innocent mistake of this kind. It is inherent in the
nature of tendering exercises that they are likely to involve last-minute
calculations by bidders as their potential subcontractors and other suppliers
attempt to avoid “bid-shopping” by submitting their bids or quotations to
the bidder at the eleventh hour. In the Canvar case, for example, the trial
judge noted that the tender of Canvar itself and all of the eight other
bidders were submitted in the final six minutes prior to the closing of
tenders.18 The fact that errors are likely to and do occur in this setting is
amply evidenced in the case law of mistaken bids. 
It would be most surprising if the reaction of the average member of
the public to situations of this kind was that the mistaken bidder should
invariably be hung out to dry. In the absence of survey evidence on point,
it is of interest that engineers retained by Metropolitan Toronto to make an
assessment of a similar error on a construction project noted that the
contractor, if required to proceed, would likely sustain a loss in the order
of $250,000. The engineers, having satisfied themselves that the error was
genuine, recommended against forcing an equivalent loss upon the
mistaken bidder and observed as follows:
This sum would represent a substantial fine to a convicted felon let alone an honest
businessman who made a mistake at no one’s expense but his own.19
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17 (1999), 46 C.L.R. (2d) 116 (Ont. Gen. Div.), rev’d (2000), 131 O.A.C. 116 (Ont.
C.A.).
18 Ibid. at 117.
19 Reported at Metropolitan Toronto v. Poole Construction Ltd. (1979), 10 M.P.L.R.
157 at 160 (Ont. S.C.) [Poole]. Passages from the engineers’ report are set out in Christine
Boyle and David Percy, eds., Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 7th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2004) at 201. The particular dispute was resolved in the mistaken bidder’s favour, 
One suspects that such views may be widely held within the
construction industry.20 Unsurprisingly, then, mistaken bidders continue to
assert claims and defences arising from their mistaken bids. Moreover,
apparently impressed by the justice of their position, courts are inclined,
where possible, to find a way around a straightforward application of the
Ron Engineering approach. As we shall see, this was the result, for
example, in the Canvar case itself. Such diversionary tactics, however,
lead to complex and difficult, if not incoherent, doctrine. The recent
Alberta and Ontario decisions indicate that the problem can be more
successfully addressed in a direct fashion.
4. Mistaken Bids and the Law of Contractual Mistake
Concise explication of the law of contractual mistake is bedevilled by
terminological complexity and other conceptual muddles. Nonetheless,
there is a reasonably wide scholarly and judicial consensus that the law of
contractual mistake, as it relates to the enforceability of agreements, can be
divided into two subcategories, misunderstanding and mistaken
assumptions. The law of misunderstanding, when applicable, prevents the
very formation of an agreement. The law of mistaken assumptions, when
applicable, holds that an agreement, though validly formed from a
consensus ad idem perspective may be set aside on the basis that it has
been entered into on the basis of a fundamental mistake concerning the
context or actual circumstances of the agreement. 
a) Misunderstanding
Parties who misunderstand each other have different understandings of the
meaning of a particular term or terms of their proposed agreement. Where
the term is fatally ambiguous in the sense that neither party can rely on an
objective interpretation of the provision as a trump card, the agreement
fails for lack of consensus. I expect that most law teachers’ favourite
example of the phenomenon involves the famous case involving a contract
for the sale of cargo aboard HMS Peerless. As it happened, there were two 
92008] Mistaken Bids and Unilateral Mistaken Assumptions...
relying on the prior doctrine overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ron
Engineering; see Toronto (Metropolitan) v. Poole Construction Ltd., [1980] O.J. No. 633 
(C.A.)(QL), affirming the lower court decision, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (January
27, 1981) (as it happens, the same day that the decision in Ron Engineering was handed
down). 
20 As John Swan noted at the time, among the materials filed in Ron Engineering
was A Guide to Construction and Tendering Procedures endorsed by a number of
professional and trade associations engaged in the industry. The Guide states that “If there
is a serious and demonstrable error in the tender, the bidder should be allowed to withdraw
without penalty.” See Swan, supra note 13 at 463.
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ships Peerless, one of which was intended by the seller and the other of
which was intended by the buyer.21 The agreement was unenforceable on
grounds of fatal ambiguity. 
Misunderstanding will also prevent formation of a contract where only
one party misunderstands the meaning of the agreement but the other party
is aware of that misunderstanding. One might say that the
misunderstanding in such a case is “one-sided” or “unilateral” in the sense
that only one party suffers from the mistake. The fact that the other party
is aware of the error, however, prevents the formation of a consensus ad
idem. In a case where it is the offeror who suffers from a misunderstanding,
the point is often explained by saying that the offeree “cannot snap up the
offer” but in a case where it is the offeree who is mistaken to the
knowledge of the offeror, the rule preventing formation also applies. 
Applying the law of misunderstanding to mistaken bids, it is easily
seen how the Ron Engineering decision slams the door in the face of the
mistaken bidder. Under prior law, a bidder who has informed the issuer of
the invitation of the mistake prior to the moment of the issuer’s acceptance
of the offer constituted by the bid, can plausibly argue that the issuer
should not be allowed to “snap up the bid.” The issuer knows that the
bidder’s mind no longer “goes along with” the price expressed in the bid.
After Ron Engineering, however, a binding Contract A has been entered
into prior to the issuer’s awareness of any mistake. Thus, even though the
bid is infected by, let us assume, a clerical or mathematical error, the issuer
is unaware of this fact and accordingly, the law of misunderstanding is
simply inapplicable to the formation of Contract A. The numerical price
term is unambiguous. The offeree is unaware of the offeror’s error. As
Estey J. said, “… no mistake existed which impeded or affected the
coming into being of contract A.”22 The law of “misunderstanding” does
not prevent formation of the agreement in these circumstances. 
Estey J. did leave a slender escape hatch ajar in Ron Engineering by
suggesting that it might be that a form of tender might be “so lacking” that
it could not constitute an acceptance of Contract A.23 Further, he suggested
that there might be a possibility that “by some abstract doctrine of law a
tender which could not form the basis of a contract upon acceptance in the
sense of Contract B, could not operate as a tender to bring into being 
10 [Vol.87
21 Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864), 2 H. & C. 906 (Ex.); see also A.W. Brian Simpson, 
“Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless” (1999) 11 Cardozo
L. Rev. 287.
22 Supra note 1 at 125.
23 Ibid.
Contract A.”24 Although no more revealing explanation of the nature of
that abstract doctrine was suggested by Estey J., it was in his mind
inapplicable to the circumstances of a mistaken bid such as that which
occurred in Ron Engineering. Estey J. also noted in passing that
…we are not here concerned with a case where the mistake committed by the
tendering contractor is apparent on the face of the tender.25
It is not obvious how the existence of a palpable error would assist the
bidder who is, by the rule’s definition, the offeree who is accepting the
offer set out in the invitation to bid. If the submission of the bid amounts
to saying, in effect, “I accept your offer,” it is not at all obvious that the fact
that the bid itself might contain some error, palpable or otherwise, would
prevent the formation of the agreement. In the particular case of sealed
bids, where the issuer of the invitation will not examine the bids until they
are opened, it is even less obvious how a palpable error on the face of the
unseen bid would somehow preclude the formation of Contract A. Apart
from some ambiguity relating to the question of the role of palpable error
on the face of the bid – a point to which we shall return – the Ron
Engineering rule thus appears to place a rather tight noose around the neck
of the mistaken bidder. Nonetheless, the palpable error escape hatch, as we
shall see, may prove to loom large in mistaken bid cases. 
b) Mistaken Assumptions
Turning to the law of mistaken assumptions, a mistaken assumption arises
in circumstances where, though the parties have reached a perfectly
satisfactory consensus ad idem or agreement on the terms of a bargain, one
or both of the parties is mistaken with respect to a fundamental assumption
concerning the background circumstances, we might say, of that bargain.
The facts of the leading case, Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd.26 are illustrative.
Lever Brothers entered into an agreement to terminate the employment of
two executives. The terms of the agreement were clearly understood both
by Lever Brothers and by the two employees. Lever Brothers entered into
the agreement on the basis of a mistaken assumption, however, that the two
employees could not be dismissed for cause. In fact, as a result of wrongful
conduct which subsequently came to light, it became apparent that the
employees could have been so terminated. At the time of contracting,
however, there was a satisfactory consensus ad idem but one of the parties,
112008] Mistaken Bids and Unilateral Mistaken Assumptions...
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. at 117.
26 [1932] A.C. 161 (H.L.) [Lever Brothers]; see also Catharine MacMillan, “How
Temptation Led to Mistake: An Explanation of Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd.” (2003) 119 L.Q.
Rev. 625.
at least, had entered into the agreement on the basis of a false assumption
concerning an important contextual fact. The mistaken assumption will
typically relate to a circumstance that explains why one or both of the
parties are willing or, indeed, eager to enter into the particular transaction.
Accordingly, mistaken assumptions are sometimes referred to, by judges
and others, as mistakes of “motive.”
The precise formulation of the actual rule concerning mistaken
assumptions has been a matter of considerable judicial and academic
controversy over the years.27 Nonetheless, there would be general
agreement on the proposition that to render an agreement unenforceable on
grounds of a mistaken assumption, it must be established that the mistake
was “common” to the parties and was, in some sense, “fundamental.”
Thus, in Lever Brothers itself for example, it was held that although the
mistake was “common” in the sense that both Lever Brothers and the
employees were labouring under the mistaken assumption that the
employees were not dismissible, the mistake in question was not
sufficiently “fundamental” in the requisite sense. Accordingly, the
mistaken assumptions rule did not apply and the agreement was
enforceable. The requirement that the mistake be “common,” then, means
that both parties must be suffering from the same mistake at the time of
formation of the agreement. An attempt to apply the law of mistaken
assumptions to a mistaken bid is easily seen to run afoul of the “common”
mistake requirement. The mistaken bidder is in error but, in the typical
case, the issuer of the invitation is not suffering from the same mistake.
The mistaken bidder is suffering from a “unilateral” mistaken assumption
that the calculations underlying the bid are accurate. Under the traditional
law of mistaken assumptions, a unilateral mistaken assumption provides
no form of relief for the mistaken bidder.
5. Mistaken Bids: Misunderstandings or Mistaken Assumptions?
One source of complexity in the law of mistaken bids arises from the fact
that it is not entirely clear whether a mistaken bid resting on a calculation
error should be considered to give rise to problems of misunderstanding or
of mistaken assumptions. Is the mistaken bid a misunderstanding of the
terms of the agreement (thus giving rise to offer and acceptance issues) or
is it a mistake concerning a background assumption (the assumed accuracy
of the underlying calculations) that might provide a basis for setting aside
the contract even though perfectly formed from a consensus ad idem
perspective?
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One might classify such a mistake as a misunderstanding on the
slightly tenuous basis that the term as expressed does not really express the
intention of the party submitting the bid. One could then say that the bidder
is mistaken with respect to the meaning of the bid. On this basis, one could
then argue that once the issuer of the invitation has been made aware of the
mistake, the issuer now knows that the bidder’s mind “does not go with”
the written document and therefore the issuer cannot “snap up the offer.”
Indeed, the judicial desire to classify the mistaken bid as a problem of
misunderstanding may well be motivated by a desire to be able to invoke
the “snapping up an offer” rule. If the mistake were to be classified as one
of mistaken assumptions, the unilateral nature of the mistake would
preclude relief for the mistaken bidder.
The more clear-headed analysis, however, might be that a mistaken
bid based on a calculation error should be classified as a mistaken
assumption because it relates to the motivation of the bidder in submitting
the bid in the form it is submitted rather than to a misunderstanding as to
the meaning of the actual terms of the bid. The mathematical terms in
which the bid price is expressed are very likely to be clearly expressed and
easily understood by the bidder. The bid price has been expressed in these
terms, however, because of a mistaken assumption that the underlying
calculations have been soundly made. The better view therefore appears to
be that a mistaken bid based on a calculation error rests on a unilateral
mistaken assumption concerning the soundness of the bidder’s underlying
calculations.28 If the calculation error is characterized as a mistaken
assumption, however, the bidder’s attempt to escape a commitment to the
mistaken price is blocked by the current requirement that, to be effective,
a mistaken assumption must be common to both parties. In the typical
case, the issuer of the invitation is unaware of the calculation error and
hence the mistaken assumption of the bidder is unilateral in character.
Under traditional doctrine, a merely unilateral mistaken assumption would
not preclude the coming into effect of Contract A.
In summary, then, the Contract A-Contract B analysis of Ron
Engineering prevents the mistaken bidder from relying on mistake
doctrine whether one characterizes the mistake in question as either a
misunderstanding or mistaken assumption. By holding that the mistake, to
be effective, must render Contract A unenforceable, the Ron Engineering
analysis slams the door on relief for mistake of either kind. Further, the
Ron Engineering analysis demolishes the slight variation on a 
misunderstanding analysis offered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Belle 
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River Community Arena Inc. v. WJZ Kaufmann Co.29 The facts of this case
followed the normal pattern. The mistaken bidder neglected to include an
item worth $70,000 in a tender price it mistakenly set at approximately
$615,000. The bidder discovered the error after the opening of the bids and
communicated the problem to the issuer of the invitation prior to a decision
by the issuer to accept the mistaken bid. The Ontario Court of Appeal was
able to find relief for the mistaken bidder on the basis that “an offeree
cannot accept an offer which he knows has been made by mistake and
which affects a fundamental term of the contract.”30 It is not clear whether
the apparently novel idea that there could be a new category of mistake
which affects a term of the contract was intended to find a via media
between a misunderstanding and mistaken assumption analysis.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Arnup J.A. had a misunderstanding analysis in
mind as he went on to observe, for the Court, that “the purported offer [i.e.
the bid], because of the mistake, is not the offer that the offeror intended to
make, and the offeree knows that.”31 Thus, although, as required by
traditional law, the mistake was not a mistake as to the meaning of a term
in the contract, the Court was nonetheless of the view that since the
mistake in question affected a fundamental term of the contract, the
mistaken bid could not be “snapped up” by the issuer of the invitation. This
creative solution to the problem did not find favour with the Supreme
Court of Canada in Ron Engineering. Ron Engineering was also an
Ontario case and, in the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Court had applied its
previous analysis in Belle River with the result that the mistaken bidder
would be entitled to recover its deposit and, presumably, would have been
excused from any obligation to enter into a building contract with the
issuer. In Ron Engineering, however, the Supreme Court quite explicitly
rejected the analysis of the Court of Appeal and overruled Belle River. As
we have noted, the traditional view, adhered to by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Belle River, that it was the bid rather than the invitation that
constituted the offer, was overturned and replaced by the new view that the
submission of the bid constituted the acceptance of Contract A and,
accordingly, that the calculation error simply had no effect on the
formation of Contract A.
6. The Proposed Solution: A Unilateral 
Mistaken Assumptions Rule
In two recent decisions of Canadian appellate courts, a new solution to the
mistaken bidder problem has been proposed. It will be suggested here that
the proposed solution is sound, that it is, in fact, a perhaps unintentional
14 [Vol.87
29 Supra note 6.
30 Ibid. at 766 [emphasis added].
31 Ibid.
adoption of the American rule on this point and finally, that its adoption by
Canadian courts would effect a significant improvement of the common
law on this point.
The first of the two cases is the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal
in Calgary (City) v. Northern Construction Company.32 It is one of the
cases in which Canadian courts worked out the implications of the Ron
Engineering analysis with respect to a claim by the issuer for damages to
be calculated in an amount representing the difference between the
mistaken bid and the bid price of the second lowest acceptable bid. The
mistaken bidder had made the issuer aware of the mistake prior to the
issuer’s attempt to create Contract B by acceptance of the bid. The bidder
argued that, notwithstanding Ron Engineering, the formation of Contract
B was precluded by the issuer’s awareness of the calculation error. The
Court of Appeal held, however, that the mistake was irrelevant to the
formation of Contract A and that Contract A itself conferred an obligation
on the bidder to enter into Contract B at the mistaken bid price.
Accordingly, the issuer was entitled to expectation damages in the measure
claimed. One cannot fault this analysis as a straightforward application of
Ron Engineering though, as noted above, it did appear that Estey J. was
hesitant to articulate this implication of the Ron Engineering analysis in the
Ron Engineering case itself. Nonetheless, as an application of the logic of
the Ron Engineering analysis, the Northern Construction decision is
beyond reproach. What is of interest for present purposes, however, is the
concurring opinion of Kerans J.A. 
Kerans J.A. began his analysis by noting the basic propositions
relating to misunderstandings, that is, mistakes as to terms. In Kerans
J.A.’s view however, these rules were inapplicable. A calculation error
leading to a mistaken bid was plainly, in his view, a mistake as to “motive”
or, in the more commonly accepted usage, a mistake as to an assumption
rather than a mistake with respect to the meaning of a particular term.
Nonetheless, it was not Kerans J.A.’s view that characterization of the
error as a mistake as to motive would invariably preclude relief. Indeed, it
was his view that rescission could be ordered in what might be considered
to be a severe or extreme case, where the effect of the error would be to
impose a “grossly disproportionate burden” on the mistaken bidder and, it
would be “unconscionable” for the issuer to hold the bidder to Contract B.
In other words, notwithstanding the unilateral nature of the mistaken
assumption, Contract B would be unenforceable. Further, a necessary
implication of this analysis is that the obligation contained in Contract A
under which the mistaken bidder could be required to enter into Contract
B must similarly be unenforceable. In other words, the unilateral mistaken
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assumption – the assumption that there was no calculation error – also has
the effect of rendering Contract A unenforceable. In applying this analysis
to the facts of the Northern Construction case, however, Kerans J.A. was
of the view that the case was not so extreme in nature that the mistaken
bidder should be excused from the obligations imposed by Contract A to
enter Contract B. Accordingly, he concurred in the result holding that the
mistaken bidder was in breach of its obligation to enter Contract B. In a
more extreme case, however, the mistaken bidder would be excused. 
A similar analysis was recently offered by a unanimous panel of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Gottardo.33 In Gottardo, the familiar fact
pattern was present. The mistaken bidder discovered an error in the form
of a failure to include a $557,000 item in a tender price of $4,811,000.
Although the bidder apprised the issuer, the Toronto Transit Commission
(TTC), of the error before the TTC purported to accept the tender, the TTC
nonetheless sought to force the bidder, Gottardo, to enter Contract B. Upon
Gottardo’s refusal to do so, the TTC awarded the contract to the next
lowest bidder and launched an action against Gottardo for $434,000, the
difference between Gottardo’s tender price and the ultimate price paid by
the TTC under the Contract B entered into with the second lowest bidder.
Although the trial judge held that Gottardo was entitled to rescission,
presumably of Contract A, on equitable grounds, the Court of Appeal
applied the Ron Engineering analysis and held that the bidder’s mistake
did not preclude the formation of Contract A. Again, however, it is of great
interest that the Court of Appeal went on to suggest that even in a case of
unilateral error of this kind, equitable relief in the form of rescission of
Contract A could be available. As with the analysis of Kerans J.A. in the
Northern Construction case, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal was of
the view that the fact situation of Gottardo was not sufficiently extreme to
warrant relief of this kind. Rouleau J.A. reasoned as follows:
In my view, there are no unique circumstances in this case which distinguish it from
Ron Engineering and which would operate so as to entitle the tenderer to have the
contract rescinded. While it is conceded that some financial hardship will flow from
enforcement of the contract, this is not sufficient to warrant rescission. The burden
imposed on Gottardo by the enforcement of the contract freely entered into is not so
grossly disproportionate so as to make enforcement of it by the courts
unconscionable.34
Rouleau J.A. concluded that “[i]n the circumstances, there are simply
no grounds for equitable intervention.”35 Although no further explanation
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was given by Rouleau J.A. as to why the burdens imposed on Gottardo by
these circumstances would not be grossly disproportionate, we may
surmise that the quantum of the error, when compared to what would have
been Gottardo’s accurate bid price of $5,368,000, a $557,000 error, or
slightly more than 10 percent of the correct price, would reduce and might
eliminate Gottardo’s profit from the project but would not result in what
might appear to be an extreme or “grossly disproportionate” form of
liability. A similar calculation can be made on the basis of the facts in the
Northern Construction case in which Kerans J.A., who proposed the
unilateral mistaken assumption rule, also declined to find that the error in
question was “grossly disproportionate” to the contract price with the
result that imposing contractual liability on the mistaken bidder would be
“unconscionable.”36
Perhaps a different result is warranted on the facts of the Canvar
case,37 however. There, it will be recalled, a $700,000 error infected the
calculation of a bid price of $2,289,000 with the result that the bidder
mistakenly reduced its bid by that amount from what would have been a
correct tendered price of approximately $3,000,000, an error of
approximately 25 percent of the value of the contract. To force the
mistaken bidder into Contract B in such circumstances would almost
certainly impose very substantial losses and, at the same, confer a rather
substantial and unearned windfall on the issuer of the invitation to bid. It
seems realistic to assume that Kerans J.A. and the Ontario Court of Appeal
would have been prepared to find such a result unconscionable and would
have allowed the bidder to decline to enter into Contract B. As we shall
see, although this was a conclusion that the trial judge in Canvar was
reluctant to adopt, the Ontario Court of Appeal narrowly and, one might
argue, artificially, distinguished the Ron Engineering authority so as to
enable the mistaken bidder to find an escape route from liability in this
case. Whether or not one agrees with this suggested application of the
proposed unilateral mistaken assumption rule to the Canvar facts,
however, it is clear that the substance of the proposal is that the mistaken
bidder will not be allowed to escape on the basis of mistakes at the lower
end of the percentage range but will be allowed to resist Contract B in
circumstances where a gross error has occurred. As we shall see, this is in
fact the American rule dealing with this problem and in the next section of
this paper a brief survey of the American law of mistaken assumptions will
be offered. We will then turn to a defence of the unilateral mistaken
assumption rule developed in American law and articulated in the
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Northern Construction and Gottardo decisions by Kerans J.A. and
Rouleau J.A.
7. The American Law of Mistaken Assumptions
The American contract law rules relating to mistaken assumptions are,
apart from the point being discussed here, essentially similar to the Anglo-
Canadian rules. That is to say, American law holds that an agreement may
be set aside where it has been entered into on the basis of a common
fundamental assumption concerning the context of the agreement. The
common mistake rule, as articulated in the Restatement of Contracts 2d,38
improves upon the traditional Anglo-Canadian formulation, however, by
stating explicitly two features of the rule which are merely implicit in the
Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. First, the Restatement clearly indicates that
a mistake will be operative only where it has a substantial impact on the
equivalence of the exchange between the parties. In the typical mistake
case - and we may use Lever Brothers as our example - one party, the
employer in that case, seeks to rescind a contract because the true facts
reveal that the bargain is unexpectedly and grossly one-sided.  In Lever
Brothers, the employer has paid a great deal of money for the release of an
obligation which did not, in fact, exist. The release was therefore of little
or non-existent value to the employer. In the light of the true factual
context, the contract was highly disadvantageous to the employer. The
second respect in which the American rule makes explicit what is implicit
in the Anglo-Canadian doctrine is that the Restatement articulation plainly
indicates that a first step in the analysis of a mistake case is to determine
whether or not the error is of a kind for which the mistaken party should
normally bear the risk or error.39 Thus, for example, a person in the
business of doing excavation work for building projects would normally
assume the risk of having poorly estimated the amount of work required to
complete a particular project with a resulting underestimate of its price.
Similarly, a supplier of goods under a long term contract of supply would
normally be assumed to take the risk of increases in the market value of the
goods which the supplier mistakenly failed to anticipate in calculating the
contract price. The whole point of such agreements, one might say, is to
allocate risks of this kind and such errors would not provide an excuse for
a supplier to withdraw from the agreement.
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The basic American common mistaken assumption rule, then, is set
out section 152 of the Restatement in the following terms:
Sec. 152 When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party
unless he bears the risk of a mistake under the rules stated in Sec. 154.40
The notion of “material effect” requires explication. The Restatement
explains that it is not sufficient to establish that but for the mistake the
mistaken party would not have entered the contract. Rather, the mistake
must be such “that the resulting imbalance in the agreed exchange is so
severe that [the mistaken party] cannot fairly be required to carry it out.”41
Subsection (2) of 152 provides that in determining whether or not there has
been a “material effect” on the agreed exchange, a court should take into
account any relief that might be available “by way of reformation,
restitution or otherwise.”42 In other words, to the extent that the interests
of the mistaken party are adequately protected by the rectification of the
contract or restitutionary relief (including, for example, a court ordered
reduction of the purchase price), the remedy of rescission may not be
necessary. 
As intimated, section 154 then goes on to articulate the fundamental
features of a risk allocation analysis in the following terms:
Sec. 154 When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake 
A party bears the risk of a mistake when 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge
with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge
as sufficient, or 
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable in the
circumstances to do so.43
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Subparagraphs (a) and (b) evidently identify circumstances in which
the mistaken party should reasonably understand that he or she bears the
risk of errors of this kind. Subparagraph (c), however, suggests that there
are circumstances in which, although the mistaken party may not have
appreciated the assumption of the risk in question, a court may determine
that in a contract of this particular type, the risk of the particular error in
question is assumed by the mistaken party. Again, it is my view that risk
allocation analysis of this kind is certainly implicit in Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence. Indeed, in recent years, it has become a more explicit
feature of both English and Canadian mistaken assumptions law. Thus, one
possible explanation – I would suggest the only plausible explanation – for
the result in Lever Brothers44 is that in the context of negotiating a
severance agreement of the kind of issue in that case, the employer may be
considered to assume the risk of errors resulting from a failure to
investigate the dismissability of the employee in question with reasonable
diligence.
In summary, then, the American rule relating to common mistaken
assumptions set out in sections 152 and 154 of the Restatement appears to
offer what is essentially an elegant and more explicit statement of the
Anglo-Canadian doctrine on this point.45 Indeed, the illustrations of these
sections set out in the Restatement indicate results that are consistent with
current Anglo-Canadian doctrine. American law departs from the
traditional Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on mistaken assumptions,
however, by articulating a rule permitting the setting aside of agreements
on the basis of a unilateral mistake in assumptions. That rule is set out in
section 153 of the Restatement in the following terms:
Sec. 153 When Mistake of One Party Makes a Contract Voidable
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if
he does not bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in section 154, and 
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(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable, or 
(b) the other party had reason to know the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.
We may note that, unlike the common mistaken assumptions rule, the
unilateral mistaken assumptions rule requires not only that the mistake
have a material effect on the agreed exchange but further requires that the
effect of the mistake must be such that enforcement of the contract would
be “unconscionable.” In other words, the unilateral mistake rule applies
only, one might say, in extreme circumstances. 
The reason for setting a higher threshold for operative mistake in the
context of a unilateral error may be thought to be obvious. Where the
mistake is common and fundamental in nature, the situation is one in
which both parties might reasonably agree (if asked at the time of contract
formation at least) that the enforceability of the agreement is subject to an
understanding that the underlying context is as the parties assumed to be.
In the context of a common and fundamental mistaken assumption, then,
the circumstances are ripe for the implication of an implied term
conditioning the enforceability of the agreement on that assumption. In
other words, we are in this context engaged in an exercise of giving effect
to what may be considered to be the reasonable expectations of both parties
in the circumstances in question.46 When one turns to unilateral mistake,
however, the grounds for relief appear weaker. The non-mistaken party can
plausibly argue that it reasonably expected the agreement to be
unconditionally enforceable in the circumstances. Hence, the Restatement
insists on a higher threshold of an error of such a nature that enforcement
of the agreement would be “unconscionable.” As the Restatement explains:
“The reason for this additional requirement is that, if only one party was
mistaken, avoidance of the contract will more clearly disappoint the
expectations of the other party than if he too was mistaken.”47 We shall
return to this point below.
Consistent with this particular rationale for a higher threshold, the
Restatement further stipulates in subparagraph (b) of section 153 that it
would be material to take into account whether or not the non-mistaken
party “had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.”
The non-mistaken party’s entitlement to claim a reasonable expectation
that the agreement should be enforced unconditionally is obviously
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weakened if such circumstances are present. Indeed, it is this consideration
that makes Lever Brothers48 such a difficult case. The employees in
question engaged in what might be considered to be rather gross breaches
of fiduciary obligation. The House of Lords took the view, perhaps
somewhat charitably, that the employees were unaware of the significance
of their conduct – and hence the mistaken assumption that they were not
dismissible for cause was “common” to the parties. A plausible view of the
Lever Brothers facts might be that only Lever Brothers was unaware of the
conduct rendering the employees dismissible. Let us assume that the
employees were aware of and had present to their minds at the time of
contracting, the nature of their misconduct and its significance. On this
view, the mistake is a unilateral mistaken assumption and therefore
inoperative on traditional Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. American law,
however, which renders the fact that the employees had reason to know of
the employer’s error at least relevant, may offer a preferable analytical
framework for considering the particular context of cases like Lever
Brothers. This is not to say, however, that Lever Brothers itself becomes an
easy case under section 153. The question of whether the employer should
be taken to assume the risk of such errors, though presumably the critical
issue, is a matter upon which reasonable jurists might well differ.
It is worth emphasizing that the term “unconscionable” is being used
in the context of section 153 to identify a concept approximating that of
severe unfairness or injustice. In Canadian common law, of course, the
concept of unconscionability has acquired a different meaning in the
context of inequality of bargaining power. Thus, it is well-established
Canadian law that where there exists in the formation of an agreement a
severe inequality of bargaining power between the parties and an unfair
advantage taken of that imbalance by the stronger party, the contract may
be set aside or rescinded on grounds of “unconscionability.”49
“Unconscionability” in the context of section 153, however, does not rest
on inequality of bargaining power in this sense. Rather, it is intended to
refer to situations where the result of enforcing the contract,
notwithstanding the unilateral error, would be extremely unfair or unjust.
Enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable only in the sense
that it permits the non-mistaken party to press an unfair advantage
resulting from the other party’s innocent error.
As is readily seen, then, the rule proposed by Kerans J.A. and the
Ontario Court of Appeal in the Northern Construction and Gottardo cases
rather precisely mirrors the American rule restated in section 153 of the
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Restatement. It is of some interest, then, that in the illustrations to section
153 set out in the accompanying text of the Restatement, one finds the
following:
In response to B’s invitation for bids on the construction of a building according to
stated specifications, A submits an offer to do the work for $150,000. A believes that
this is the total of a column of figures, but he has made an error by inadvertently
omitting a $50,000 item, and in fact the total is $200,000. B having no reason to
know of A’s mistake, accepts A’s bid. If A performs for $150,000, he will sustain a
loss of $20,000 instead of making an expected profit of $30,000. If the court
determines that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, it is voidable
by A.50
The Restatement emphasizes, however, that the precise impact of the
error on the financial burdens of the mistaken bidder should be examined.
Thus, for example, a $15,000 error on a bid with respect to which the
bidder had estimated a profit of $50,000 would not give rise to rescission
on grounds of unconscionability.51 Further, as the relief is equitable in
nature, it should not be awarded in such fashion as to unfairly prejudice the
non-mistaken party. Thus, relief may be withheld where the party has
engaged in acts of detrimental reliance.52 Finally, as in all mistake cases, it
is necessary to consider whether the mistake relates to a matter for which
the bidder would normally assume the risk of error. Thus, the American
cases typically distinguish between clerical or calculation errors, to which
the section 153 analysis might apply and “errors of judgment”53 – such as
exercising poor judgment in estimating how the work in question might be
done most economically – for which the bidder would normally be
considered to assume the risk of error.
8. The Case for Recognition of a Unilateral 
Mistaken Assumptions Rule
The principal argument in favour of recognition of a unilateral mistaken
assumption rule is that it facilitates the achievement of just results in cases
of extreme unilateral mistaken assumptions. Taking the mistaken bid cases
50 Restatement, supra note 38 at 395.
51 Ibid. at 396 illustration 2.
52 Ibid. at 396-97. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, 2d ed.
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 1998) at 588. A leading US contracts scholar has proposed
an attractive refinement of the American rule to the effect that in a case where rescission is
withheld and the contract is therefore enforceable, the issuer’s damages should be limited
to reliance losses; see Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Mistake in Contract Law” (2003) 91 Cal. L.
Rev. 1573 at 1596-1601.
53 For explication of the American doctrine on this point, see Farnsworth, ibid. at
589-90.
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as an illustration, where a gross or, indeed, grotesque error results from a
clerical or calculation slip, the imposition of liability on the mistaken
bidder to carry forward with Contract B, on pain of suffering an
expectancy damages claim if the mistaken bidder refuses to do so, seems
most unjust or, in the language of Kerans J.A., the Ontario Court of Appeal
and the American rule, “unconscionable.” The imposition of such liability
provides a huge unearned windfall for the issuer of the invitation. At the
same time, it exacts a harsh and unduly onerous penalty on the mistaken
bidder. Unsurprisingly, American experience confirms that most
applications of a unilateral mistaken assumptions rule occur in the context
of bids affected by clerical or calculation errors. As the American case law
also illustrates, however, similar cases of injustice can arise outside the
context of mistaken bids. The rule has also been relied upon to set aside
transactions for the sale of land where one party is mistaken as to the
identity of the parcel to be sold or its boundaries. In one case,54 for
example, a purchaser who had purchased unseen and, for his purposes,
valueless land by correspondence on the faith of a favourable report by an
agent who mistakenly viewed the wrong property, was held entitled to
rescind on the basis of unilateral error. In another, a purchaser was
permitted to escape a transaction on the basis of a mistaken unilateral
assumption that all of the land surrounded by a fence was included in the
parcel.55 Similarly, buyers have been permitted to avoid agreements for the
sale of goods because of unilateral error concerning the identity of the
goods being offered for sale.56 In one such case, the newspaper in which
the seller advertised the item for sale had mistakenly listed a much lower
price for the item than the seller had instructed.57
A second argument in favour of recognition of a unilateral mistaken
assumption rule is that it will enable the courts to do directly what they will
otherwise be sorely tempted to achieve indirectly. When the imposition of
liability on, for example, a mistaken bidder appears to be extremely unjust,
it is not surprising that courts will be tempted to find an analytical route
that will facilitate circumvention of the Ron Engineering analysis and the
provision of an escape route to the mistaken bidder. The Canvar case58
provides an illustration of this phenomenon. At trial, the mistaken bidder,
relying on the proposed unilateral mistake rule suggested by Kerans J.A.
54 Fleischer v. McGehee (1914), 163 S.W. 109 (Ark.). See also Goodrich v. Lathrop
(1892), 29 P. 329 (Cal.).
55 Beatty v. Depue (1960), 103 N.W. 2d. 187 (S.D.).
56 Calvin v. Baskett (1966), 407 S.W. 2d 19 (Tex. C.A.).
57 Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001), 27 P. 3d 702 (Cal.). For discussion of this case,
see “Contract Law – Unilateral Mistake – Supreme Court of California Explicitly Accepts
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Provisions as State Law” (2001) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 724
[“Contract Law – Unilateral Mistake”].
58 Supra note 17.
252008] Mistaken Bids and Unilateral Mistaken Assumptions...
in the Northern Construction case, argued that it ought to be excused on
the basis that the burden imposed by the error was “grossly
disproportionate,” and would therefore lead to a result that was
“unconscionable.” The trial judge, obviously attracted by this possible
solution, invited counsel to provide further guidance on the meaning of
“unconscionability” in this context. Unfortunately counsel, perhaps feeling
constrained to refer only to the Canadian law of unconscionable
transactions on this point, placed emphasis in their response on inequality
of bargaining power. There being no problem of inequality of bargaining
power present, the trial judge concluded that the requirement of
“unconscionability” had not been met. An opportunity to explore the type
of unconscionability evidently intended by Kerans J.A. and explicated in
the American doctrine was thereby lost. 
On further appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, however, relief for
the mistaken bidder was achieved. That escape route rested on the Court’s
analysis of the facts concerning the bid bond included in Canvar’s
mistaken bid. The trial judge had noted that the invitation to tender
required that the tender document include a bid bond in an amount that
“was to be no less than 5% of the tender price.”59 It will be recalled that
Canvar erroneously submitted a bid in the amount of $2,289,000 (rather
than $2,989,000, the amount that would have reflected an accurate
calculation). Five percent of $2,289,000 would be $114,050. In fact,
however, Canvar included a bid bond in the amount of $149,450, this being
5 percent of the $2,989,000 figure. In other words, the bid bond was
substantially in excess of the minimum amount required of $114,450. The
bond exceeded the minimum by $35,000. As a percentage of the displayed
bid price of $2,289,000, however, $149,450 is only 6.5 percent, an excess
of 1.5 percent over the prescribed minimum of 5 percent. The trial judge
did note that the amount of the bid bond, being in excess of 5 percent of
Canvar’s tendered price might raise some question of error as one might
presume that in normal business practice a bidder would include only the
minimum of the required bid bond. Nonetheless, it was his view that since
the invitation set out merely a minimum for the bid bond, the fact that the
minimum was exceeded did not constitute sufficient evidence of a mistake
in the sense that the issuer should have appreciated that “Canvar did not
intend to submit the tender in the form and substance it was in.”60 The
Court of Appeal, however, seized upon the excessive bid bond as evidence
of a palpable error which, in its view, prevented the formation of Contract
A. Placing less emphasis than did the trial judge on the fact that the
instructions required only a minimum of 5 percent, the Court of Appeal
held that the bidder was obliged to include a bid bond in the amount of 5
59 Ibid. at 117.
60 Ibid. at 118.
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percent of the tender price and accordingly, considered that the tender
documents revealed, “on their face, a clear error.”61 The bid therefore
contained a palpable error and could not be “snapped up.” 
The Court further noted in distinguishing the Ron Engineering line of
analysis, that Estey J. in that case acknowledged that “we are not here
concerned with a case where the mistake committed by the tendering
contractor is apparent on the face of the tender.”62 Although the application
of the palpable error analysis to the phenomenon of mistaken bids gives
rise to analytical issues that will be considered in the next section of this
article, for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the Court of Appeal
appears to have offered a somewhat generous view of the “palpable error”
or “patent error” doctrine in order to avoid application of the Ron
Engineering analysis to the Canvar facts. Canvar had submitted a bid bond
which exceeded the minimum required bid bond of 5 percent. Should the
issuer, in such circumstances, assume that the bid bond was intended by
the bidder to constitute 5 percent of the intended price and accordingly, that
a bid bond in excess of 5 percent is obviously an error? On the one hand,
to reach this conclusion appears to deprive the concept that the 5 percent
requirement was a “minimum” of any content or meaning. On the other
hand, as the Court of Appeal concluded, the existence of a bid bond in an
amount representing approximately 6.5 percent of the tendered price might
at least have raised a suspicion of error of some kind. Again, however, to
find that such an overage on the bid bond is evidence of palpable error
preventing the application of Ron Engineering does appear to be a rather
strained application of the palpable error rule. Moreover, as we shall see, it
is not entirely clear how the Ron Engineering logic accommodates
application of the palpable error rule. To this point we shall return.
It is argued here, however, that a more direct route for achieving this
eminently sensible result in Canvar would be to adopt the approach
advocated by Kerans J.A. and the Ontario Court of Appeal and hold that in
these circumstances where a grossly disproportionate liability would
otherwise be imposed on the mistaken bidder with a result that it is
properly considered to “unconscionable,” the mistaken bidder ought to be
permitted to rescind Contract A on the basis of a unilateral mistaken
assumption that the tender price stated in the bid was an accurate one.
Application of the unilateral mistake rule to the Canvar facts achieves
directly what the Ontario Court of Appeal has achieved only indirectly
through a somewhat strained application of the palpable error rule. 
61 Ibid. at para. 6.
62 Supra note 1 at 117.
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As is generally the case with indirect analytical solutions, the Canvar
analysis is also unsatisfactory because it produces unattractively
inconsistent results. The result achieved in the Court of Appeal rests on the
happenstance of the fact that an erroneous tender price was coupled with
an accurately calculated bid deposit. If Canvar had calculated its bid
deposit on the basis of 5 percent of the mistaken price – thereby
compounding its error, one might say – no palpable error would have been
present on the face of the bid and Canvar would have been subjected to
liability of an arguably draconian nature. By addressing the problem
directly, the unilateral mistake rule avoids inconsistent results of this kind.
As a matter of general principle, the achievement of just results by indirect
means is not an ideal solution. As Karl Llewellyn famously remarked in
another, but similar, context “covert tools are never reliable tools.”63
A third consideration weighing in favour of the adoption of a unilateral
mistaken assumption rule on the American model is that it provides a much
more satisfactory solution than does current Anglo-Canadian doctrine to
the problem arising in cases where the non-mistaken party either is or
perhaps should be aware of the mistaken party’s error. This problem is
neatly illustrated by the fact situation of the famous Lever Brothers case.
As we have noted, the impugned transaction in that case was an agreement
terminating the services of two senior Lever executives in circumstances
where, unbeknownst to Lever Brothers, the two executives had engaged in
breaches of their fiduciary obligations to their employer. If Lever Brothers
had been aware of the misconduct of the executives, their contracts of
employment could have been terminated for cause. As noted above, the
House of Lords held in this case that the existence of this conduct was not
present to the mind of the executives when the agreement was negotiated.
Accordingly, the error – that is, the assumption that the employees could
only be dismissed for cause – was “common” and it only remained to
consider therefore whether the error was sufficiently fundamental. Under
existing Anglo-Canadian law it was necessary to find that the mistake was
“common” in order to make the law of mistaken assumptions potentially
applicable. If the mistake was merely unilateral on the part of Lever
Brothers because the nature or significance of the misconduct was present
to the mind of the employees, mistaken assumptions doctrine would be
simply inapplicable. Application of the requirement that mistaken
assumptions be “common” thus leads to a perverse result in such
circumstances. If the mistake is merely unilateral, traditional Anglo-
Canadian law would suggest that the employees have no obligation to 
63 Karl Llewellyn, “Book Review” (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 at 703.
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disclose the nature of their misconduct when negotiating the agreement.64
Oddly, the more the employees know, the worse is the position of Lever
Brothers. Under a doctrine of unilateral mistaken assumptions on the
American model, however, it would become material to consider whether
the non-mistaken party “had reason to know of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.” In other words, the American rule, by permitting
Lever Brothers to rescind for material unilateral error in the presence of
such circumstances would make relevant a consideration of the state of the
employees’ knowledge of the facts underlying their employer’s error and
their role in causing the mistake. Surely, it is hard to gainsay the argument
that this is a relevant inquiry in the context of the facts of Lever Brothers.
This is not to suggest, however, that the result of Lever Brothers, even
upon application of the American rule, is necessarily an obvious one. One
might reasonably persist in the view that in negotiating agreements of this
kind an employer assumes the risk of errors resulting from failure to make
appropriate inquires. The important point for present purposes, however, is
that the American unilateral mistaken assumptions rule makes relevant a
line of inquiry that seems plainly material but is rendered irrelevant under
existing Anglo-Canadian doctrine.
In sum, the proposed unilateral mistake rule delivers more just results
in cases of extreme error, it avoids the necessity of courts using covert or
indirect tools to dispense justice in such cases and it provides a better
analytical framework than does current law in cases where the non-
mistaken party knew or ought to have known of or has caused the mistaken
party’s error.
For reasons such as these, then, it is suggested that modification of
Canadian doctrine suggested by Kerans J.A. in Northern Construction and
Rouleau J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gottardo would represent
a useful improvement in the Canadian law of mistaken assumptions. A
fourth argument in favour of the unilateral mistaken assumptions approach
is that it deals more directly and satisfactorily with the problem of
unilateral palpable error than does current law because of the
complications for the palpable mistake analysis produced by the Ron
Engineering doctrine. The Ron Engineering analysis makes it difficult to
apply the palpable error rule. The unilateral mistaken assumptions rule
elegantly solves this problem. This argument for the new approach is
explored in the next section of this article.
64 This would be the orthodox result of applying the caveat emptor principle of
Smith v. Hughes (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 (Div. Ct.) and the general proposition drawn from 
Smith v. Hughes that negotiating parties have no general duty to disclose material facts to
the other party. See generally, McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 7 at  331ff. 
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9. Unilateral Error, Ron Engineering and 
the Palpable Mistake Rule
Under the Ron Engineering analysis, Contract A is created when the bid is
submitted. The submission of the bid is the acceptance of the offer
constituted by the invitation to tender. From that point in time, then, both
parties become bound by Contract A. In the typical case, the bidder is
bound by Contract A to forfeit a deposit or bid bond in the event that, when
selected, the bidder refuses to enter Contract B. For its part, the issuer of
the invitation is bound to conduct the tendering process in accord with the
rules set out in the invitation and such implied terms as have been found to
exist by the courts applying the Ron Engineering line of authority,
including the implicit obligation to treat all bidders fairly and equally. This
is the basic Ron Engineering analysis. In the typical case, where the bid
accurately expresses the intentions of the bidder, this scheme works
satisfactorily from an offer and acceptance perspective. Nor does it matter
whether the issuer actually sees and reviews the bid. It is the submission of
the bid which is the acceptance of the issuer’s offer. The issuer merely
receives that acceptance in order to create Contract A and does not in any
legal sense “accept” that acceptance. Thus, the Ron Engineering scheme
also functions quite satisfactorily from an offer and acceptance point of
view in the context of sealed bids. The fact that the issuer of the invitation
will not even see the bid until the opening of bids does not prevent the
formation of Contract A at the time the bid is submitted. Even where bids
are sealed, then, both parties are bound to the rules of the tendering process
set out in the invitation.
So far so good. But what of the situation where there is a palpable error
on the face of the bid? Although it is tempting to grant relief to the
mistaken bidder in such circumstances, it is not immediately obvious how
a palpable error on the face of a bid – often, by agreement of the parties,
unread by the offeree – can prevent the formation of Contract A.
Obviously, it is attractive to retain a “palpable error” escape hatch if it can
be done. Two possibilities emerge. One could take the view that, as a
matter of offer and acceptance doctrine in a two-contract situation, the
initial bid (the acceptance of the offer contained in the invitation) must
contain an offer to enter Contract B that could be binding if the usual rules
of offer and acceptance were to apply to the formation of Contract B. A
difficulty with this analysis is that a binding commitment to enter Contract
B is set out in the bid and Ron Engineering does not appear to envisage a
separate formation process for Contract B. Thus the fact the bidder may
draw the issuer’s attention to the error before the issuer’s “acceptance” of
contract – the very facts of Ron Engineering – does not prevent formation
of Contact B. In an ordinary offer and acceptance setting, such a
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disclosure, however, would preclude formation. To accommodate the
palpable error rule, then, one has to take the view that a bid containing a
palpable error (even though unseen by the issuer) is fatally flawed (and
therefore not an acceptance) unless it is free of the sort of palpable error
that would prevent formation of Contract B on the basis of the palpable
error rule. Although unattractively complex and arguably circular, this
novel rule would achieve the desired result – bids containing palpable
errors do not constitute an acceptance and no Contract A is entered. This,
indeed, appears to be the “abstract doctrine” briefly alluded to by Estey J.
in Ron Engineering.65
An alternative and more straightforward solution, perhaps, would be
to hold that the invitation includes an implied term to the effect that tenders
must not contain a palpable error. Thus a bid that contains such an error
does not comply with the terms of the invitation and, as a non-compliant
bid,66 therefore does not contain a proper acceptance of the invitation.
Although this is, to be sure, a rather odd term to imply on the basis of
presumed intentions of the parties, it would, again, achieve the desired
result.
Each of these solutions suffers from two deficiencies. First, both are
sufficiently complex that they are not likely to leap quickly even to the
legal mind. Second, whether one insinuates a palpable error analysis into
the bid either as a novel offer and acceptance rule or as an implied term in
the invitation, there is no obvious explanation for the fact that the new rule
or implied term is limited to palpable errors. One could as easily construct
an offer and acceptance rule stating that an effective bid must be free of
major errors, or at least major errors disclosed to the issuer in timely
fashion. Alternatively, the implied term could be constructed in any of
these forms. If we are to invent a new rule or an implied term, there is no
reason to restrict it to palpable error. If the underlying premise for applying
the palpable error doctrine in this setting is that a notional formation of
Contract B is to take place, any error, when disclosed by the bidder, could
prevent formation. As a matter of commercial practicality there does not
seem to be a convincing reason for restricting relief to cases of palpable
error. In summary, then, the attempt to preserve relief from Contract B for
palpable error generates either a complex and novel offer and acceptance
rule or a rather improbable implied term. In each case, it is not obvious
why we would wish to restrict relief to palpable error.
Again, recognition of the doctrine of unilateral mistaken assumptions
appears to provide a more elegant solution. The bidder’s mistake is
65 Supra note 1 at 125.
66 M.J.B. Enterprises v. Defence Construction (1951) Ltd., supra note 12.
unilateral because it is only the bidder who suffers from the calculation
error. The issuer is simply unaware that such an error has occurred.
Nonetheless, the case is still one of unilateral mistaken assumption.
Accordingly, the unilateral mistaken assumption rule potentially applies
and renders Contract A voidable provided that the error creates a
disproportionate burden and renders the enforcement of Contract A
“unconscionable.” When the basis for relief is framed in terms of the
unilateral mistaken assumption rule it is more obvious that the rule could
apply whether or not the mistake is palpable. For the rule to apply, it is not
necessary to show that the non-mistaken party, the issuer of the invitation,
could or should have been aware of the error. In a case like Canvar, then,
the unilateral mistaken assumption analysis provides a basis for rescission,
whether or not the error is palpable, as long as the burden imposed by the
error is grossly disproportionate and enforcement of the agreement would
be “unconscionable.” If the issuer has reasonably and detrimentally relied
on the form of the bid, however, relief, as we have seen, will be denied.
Under this analysis, does there remain any role for palpable error?
Again, for the American rule to apply it is not necessary for the issuer to
have seen a palpable error on the face of the bid at the time of submission
of the bid. But what if the issuer did see the bid at that time? Surely the
palpable nature of the error ought to have some relevance. Indeed, it would
be relevant under the American version of the rule. If the error is palpable
and the bid is seen by the issuer at the time of formation of Contract A, it
can therefore be said that the issuer is or should have been aware of the
error at the time of formation. Under the American rule, this fact could be
taken into account in applying the unilateral mistaken assumption rule
more generously. As we have seen, it would not be necessary in such a
case, under Restatement section 153(b), to establish that the burden is
disproportionate and that the result is unconscionable. 
In summary, then, the fact that the unilateral mistaken assumptions
rule provides a more elegant and satisfactory basis for dealing with
palpable error than can be accommodated within the logic of Ron
Engineering offers another persuasive reason, in my view, for adopting the
views expressed by Kerans J.A. and Rouleau J.A. and applying a unilateral
mistaken assumptions rule in this context. 
10. A Rebuttal of Possible Criticisms of the 
Unilateral Mistaken Assumptions Rule
It remains, then, to consider the possible arguments that might be made
against broader recognition of the unilateral mistaken assumptions rule
articulated by Kerans J.A. and Rouleau J.A. At a general level of analysis,
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the granting of relief for mistaken assumptions and, more particularly,
unilateral mistaken assumptions raises the prospect of defeating the
reasonable expectations of one of the parties to the agreement. This
objection yields, I will suggest, to a more careful consideration of what
those expectations might be in the particular context of tendering
processes. Further, consideration must be given to the suggestion made by
Estey J. in Ron Engineering to the effect that relief should be denied since
“the integrity of the bidding system must be protected where under the law
of contracts it is possible to do so.”67 Finally, attention must be paid to the
possible objection that the proposed standards of “grossly
disproportionate” burdens and “unconscionable” results are so
unattractively vague that a unilateral mistaken assumption doctrine should
not be more broadly adopted.
As noted above, the Restatement justifies the imposition of a higher
threshold of “unconscionability” rather than “materiality” in the context of
unilateral as opposed to common mistaken assumptions on the basis that
“if only one party was mistaken, avoidance of the contract will more
clearly disappoint the expectations of the other party than if he too was
mistaken.”68 In other words, the Restatement favours relief for the
mistaken party only in extreme cases in deference to the alleged reasonable
expectations of the non-mistaken party. It may be asked, however, whether
the possible frustration of reasonable expectations is potentially an
argument for simply withholding relief of any kind in unilateral mistaken
assumption cases. The answer to this suggestion, in my view, is to be found
by considering more carefully what the reasonable expectations of the non-
mistaken party are likely to be. In the tendering context, for example, we
may ask whether or not it actually is the case that the issuer of the
invitation has a reasonable expectation that the bids are all accurately
calculated and that the lowest bid may be accepted on its face. Though it
may be true that such thoughts occur to issuers from time to time, it is also
quite likely that experienced issuers are aware of the fact that the
somewhat frantic nature of the typical bidding process is such that clerical
and mathematical errors in bids do, in fact, occur. At a more general level,
however, it seems most unlikely that issuers have reasonable expectations
that they will be able to take advantage of mathematical and clerical errors
committed by bidders. If asked to explain the purpose of tendering a
project, the typical issuer is surely likely to explain that tendering the
project increases the likelihood of entering into a contract with a successful
bidder in what will prove to be a fair and competitive price. It would be
most surprising if an issuer were to continue to say: “And, moreover,
bidders often make mistakes in calculating their bid price and, if you are
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lucky, you may be able to snap up a mistaken bid and get the project done
for substantially less than a fair and competitive price, even though this
may cause substantial financial hardship for the bidder.” Indeed, in the
unlikely event that issuers had such expectations, one might incline the
view that such expectations are not “reasonable.” In short, it is very
difficult to defend a “no relief ever” principle on the basis that such a rule
is necessary in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the
non-mistaken party.
It may be thought that this argument proves too much. If it cannot be
said that the non-mistaken party has reasonable expectations of being able
to take advantage of any mistakes that arise in the calculation of a bid, why
would one simply not give relief in all cases of clerical or mathematical
error rather than restrict relief to extreme cases of “grossly
disproportionate” burdens and “unconscionability.” Indeed, one author has
suggested that American law could be improved by moving from an
extreme case rule to a rule permitting relief for any case of mathematical
or clerical error.69 A simple response to this proposal, for purposes of
Canadian law, is that such a rule is simply precluded by the holding in Ron
Engineering. Whatever that case may be thought to stand for, it is rather
plainly an authority which holds that the mere fact of a mathematical or
clerical error in a bid does not provide a basis for rescission. To allow relief
across the board in such cases would thus require an overruling of that
case, an event which is, in my view at least, unlikely to occur in the
foreseeable future. 
Apart from the matter of precedent, however, there is a reason of
principle that may be considered to support the approach advocated by
Kerans J.A. and Rouleau J.A. of restricting relief to cases of extreme error.
A principled argument for rejecting a rule that would allow relief for every
clerical or mathematical error in a bid – however large or small – could rest
on a risk allocation analysis. One could plausibly take the view that with
respect to minor errors, both bidders and issuers might commonly expect
that bidders would assume the risk of minor clerical or mathematical errors
in the calculation of the bid. Bidders would not reasonably expect, one
might say, that only if a bid is completely error free could it ever be
accepted by an issuer. Risk allocation analysis does not point very
precisely, however, in the direction of a “grossly disproportionate”
standard. Issuers and bidders might have different views as to whether
bidders should be deemed to assume the risk of more than minor but less
than “grossly disproportionate” errors. Risk allocation analysis does
suggest, however, that a rule granting relief for even minor clerical and
mathematical errors is difficult to defend. 
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An evaluation must also be made of the suggestion made by Estey J.
that relief should be denied to the mistaken bidder plaintiff in Ron
Engineering itself in order to protect “the integrity of the bidding
system.”70 Although Estey J. did not provide further explanation of the
nature of the perceived problem with the existing law relating to bidding
processes,71 Estey J. may be reasonably interpreted, in my view, as being
concerned to discourage strategic conduct on the part of bidders designed
to improve their price position after the opening of the bids. If one
considers the types of strategic or devious conduct that bidders might be
attempted to engage in after the opening of the bids, however, a strong case
can be made for the proposition that no unhealthy incentives for strategic
behaviour are created by a rule allowing relief in extreme cases. Under pre-
Ron Engineering law, bidders would have absolutely no incentive
whatsoever to intentionally plant an extreme error in a bid or, after the
opening of the bids, to pretend deviously that an extreme error has
occurred. With respect to the incentives in play at the time of creating the
bid, no sensible bidder would intentionally plant an error in the bid with a
view to providing an excuse in the event that they should be selected as the
lowest bidder. Bidders are in the business of attempting to win contracts
and it would make no sense from a commercial perspective to invest in the
preparation of a flawed bid in order to provide a basis for not being
awarded the project. Presumably, however, Estey J. was more concerned
with the potential for misleading conduct upon the opening of the bids.
Again, the incentives in play at this juncture do not suggest that bidders are
very likely to pretend to have committed an extreme error in order to
prevent the formation of what is now referred to as Contract B. Under prior
law, the effect of successfully persuading a court that a genuine error has
occurred is that the bidder will not be forced to enter Contract B. Again,
bidders are not in the business of trying to lose competitive bidding
processes. 
Perhaps, however, Estey J. had in mind the possibility that a successful
bidder might try to rely on an allegedly mistaken calculation in order to
improve its position as the successful bidder and secure the voluntary
agreement of the issuer to increase the bid price in an amount which would
not bring the bid price up to the level of the second lowest bid. Even
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71 Indeed, Swan was critical of the reasoning in Ron Engineering on the basis that
it failed to provide any empirical evidence of a practical problem with the existing law that
required the solution offered by that case; see Swan, supra note 13 at 452, 464. The fact
that English law appears to have persisted in the view that Contract A is normally not
formed suggests that there is some force to this criticism; see sources cited at supra note 5.
On the other hand, Estey J. was not the first nor will he be the last judge to engage in
armchair speculation concerning the practical context of the law in crafting a legal rule.
Nor, of course, is this practice restricted to judges.
though the effect of prior law would be to preclude the formation of
Contract B in this situation, an issuer might feel under some pressure to
voluntarily agree to an upward adjustment of the price in such a case and
still award Contract B to the bidder claiming the mistaken calculation.
Under prior law, but not under Ron Engineering, the bidder pretending to
be mistaken has as an available stratagem a threat to prevent the formation
of what is now called Contract B. If we assume that this is the problem
targeted by Estey J. in Ron Engineering, recognition of a rule permitting
relief, even if only in cases of extreme error, might be thought to
undermine the solution. In the new world of Ron Engineering, however, an
issuer who agreed to permit an increase in a bid price would be vulnerable
to claims by other bidders for unfair and unequal treatment.72 The devious
bidder who is trying to improve his price and still win the contract is not
likely to succeed under current law. Thus, any incentive for devious
conduct of this kind – assuming that this is a realistic concern – appears to
be offset by other features of the Contract A analysis. In short, Estey J.’s
concern about the “integrity of the bidding process” does not appear to
supply a reason for refusing to recognize a rule providing relief to a
mistaken bidder in extreme cases. 
Finally, consideration may be given to the potential complaint that a
rule based on “grossly disproportionate burdens” and “unconscionability”
in the result introduces unattractively vague standards into the analysis of
these fact situations. There is obviously some force to this criticism. The
standards articulated by the American rule and by Kerans and Rouleau
JJ.A. are indeed open-textured and vulnerable to criticism on the ground of
vagueness. As in other contexts of the law of contracts, however, a measure
of vagueness may be considered to be a price we should be willing to pay
in order to provide a standard that will deliver relief in cases of extreme
injustice. Indeed, the law of contracts is rife with open-textured standards
of one sort or another. The doctrine of unconscionable transactions itself,
of course, is a prime illustration. The standards are vague and difficult to
apply. Nonetheless, they permit courts to provide redress in cases of
extreme unfairness and are accepted by the courts as an appropriate device
for achieving such ends. Similar criticism could be made of doctrines
relating to certainty of terms, intention to create legal relations, frustration
of the venture and so on. The critical question, I would suggest, is whether
it is appropriate to provide relief in cases where innocent error will result
in enormous and unearned windfalls to issuers and oppressive burdens
placed upon the shoulders of innocently mistaken bidders. Kerans J.A.,
Rouleau J.A. and the American law of contracts support the view that relief
in such cases is warranted. I respectfully agree.
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In summary, then, the various arguments that might be advanced
against more widespread recognition in Canadian law of the rule
articulated by Kerans and Rouleau JJ.A. do not, in my view, singly or in
combination create a persuasive argument against confirmation of the
existence of a discretion to relieve for unilateral mistaken assumption in
cases of extreme error.
11. Conclusion
It has been argued here that the Ron Engineering “two-contract” analysis
of tendering situations, whatever its general merits, does not provide a
sound solution to the problem of mistaken bids. There is some irony in this
as Ron Engineering was itself a mistaken bid case. The issue in Ron
Engineering, however, was whether the mistaken bidder could be required
to forfeit a bid deposit. That decision did not consider the impact of the
“two-contract” analysis on the position of the mistaken bidder more
generally nor indeed, did it examine the implications of the Ron
Engineering analysis for the law of tendering in a more general way. This
article has attempted to tease out more particularly the problem of finding
relief of some kind for mistaken bidders. As the case law amply indicates,
cases of mistaken bids can give rise to situations where relief of some kind
for the mistaken bidder appears to be irresistibly meritorious. The recent
articulation by Kerans J.A. in the Northern Construction case and by
Rouleau J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Gottardo case of a
doctrine of unilateral mistaken assumptions provides, in my view, an
elegant solution to the mistaken bid problem. Interestingly, the rule stated
by these judges mirrors rather precisely the existing American rule on this
point. The virtues of this new solution to the problem are, as has been
argued above, that (a) it is capable of providing just results in cases of
mistaken bids and in other similar cases that cry out for relief; (b) it avoids
the necessity for courts, minded to dispense justice in such cases, to distort
other rules in order to achieve such results; (c) it provides a more elegant
analytical model for dealing with problems where the non-mistaken party
either is or should have been aware of or indeed caused the error in
question; and (d) it provides an elegant means for providing relief in the
context of mistaken bids containing palpable errors. Although clearer
recognition of the rule would not have an impact on the results of many
cases, the effect it would have in the rare cases to which it would apply
would be quite beneficial. This development in the law of mistaken
assumptions, though modest and incremental in nature, would provide a
more rational and coherent basis for results achieved only indirectly, if at
all, under current law. For all of these reasons, it is much to be hoped, in
my view, that other Canadian judges will adopt the views expressed by
Kerans and Rouleau JJ.A. and confirm the existence of a unilateral
mistaken assumptions rule in Canadian contract law.
36 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol.87
